With Donald Trump the very meaning of words is up for negotiation. What does he really mean when he promises to “build a wall”? When he pledges to end the Russo-Ukrainian war in one day?
His supporters say they don’t take him literally but seriously – but who decides what “serious” is? The very ambiguity can be part of Trump’s appeal. There’s something exhilarating in the sense one is in an exclusive negotiation with the president to define reality. It’s as if he’s welcoming you backstage from the reality show of politics to the discrete board room where meaning is made.
Thus both pro-Palestinians and supporters of Israel annexing the West Bank voted for Trump, each perfectly aware he was playing footsie with the other, but each hoping they can strike a deal with him. Meanwhile leaders in Moscow, Kyiv and across the world are wondering how they will make sense of Trump’s promise to wrap up one of the greatest conflicts in Europe since the second world war.
Trump speaks of “peace through strength”, “winning” and putting “America first”. But does “strength” come from America acting as benign protector? It could, for example, mean guaranteeing air defence for Ukraine so that nuclear facilities are safe from stray Russian bombs, thus stopping a potential nuclear catastrophe from devastating the world. Or does “strength” mean forcing Ukraine to give up its sovereignty?
In Moscow no one is in any huge rush to deal. Putin feels he’s winning on the battlefield. The economy is starting to sweat – food prices up 9% every month; interest rates at over 20% – but it’s not in crisis yet. Russia’s Soviet-era weapons run out towards the end of 2025; so Putin might start negotiations early next year but keep fighting until closer to the end of it, increasing attacks on civilians whenever the negotiations don’t go the way he likes.
How will Trump deal with these negotiations Putin-style? Russia has always demanded a demilitarised Ukraine under the Kremlin’s de facto political control. There are people around Trump who might agree to this – especially if Russia severs its military relationship with China. But would Putin ditch his strategic partnership with Xi for an erratic America?
Even sacrificing contacts with Tehran might be a poor deal for Putin. He could, however, see in Trump and his entourage a version of his own kleptocracy. Maybe a mysterious bidder will offer outlandish sums for a Trump golf course? Or help Elon Musk fly to Mars? One would hope that in such a case it’s Putin who would be delusional.
And what can Ukraine offer? In leaked memos from Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump before the election, the Ukrainian president stressed Ukraine’s vast stores of critical minerals that Americans lack, such as titanium, which is used for everything from rockets to joint replacements. But is this enough of a carrot to inspire Trump?
Whether the fighting pauses this year or not, Ukraine’s sovereignty depends on its being armed to the teeth. For the next two years at least, argues Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute, this will be hard without American artillery and logistics.
Though Trump has said he will bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, the people who he might actually end up negotiating with in earnest are the Europeans and Britain. We are the ones who can offer something interesting. Trading incentives for America. Greater spending on Nato. More pressure on Iran. “Peacekeeping” boots on the ground inside Ukraine. Help in the upcoming US economic skirmishes with China.
If the EU and UK seize the $300bn of Russian state assets sitting in Euroclear, money Putin has long written off, we can bring serious funding to the table. Trump does not need to spend any more money on Ukraine – we can buy the weapons. America can even make a profit while securing peace in Europe. Trump would be able to show how he got those parasitic Europeans to cough up, prove his detractors wrong by rebooting America’s most traditional alliances – all while putting “America first”.
But there’s also a bigger dynamic here than Trump’s immediate desires. Over the past year I’ve been collaborating with American social researchers to work out how Americans, and Republicans especially, see their country’s place in the world. In polling and in-depth interviews we found many who yearned for isolationism.
after newsletter promotion
The “international rules- based order” is not a concept that anyone ever mentions – whether in letter or in spirit. But they also admitted America needed to engage with the outside world for its own economic and physical security. They knew America is reliant on supply chains for everything from food to cars, defence, technology and medicine. They know America can’t produce everything on its own. They sensed that malign powers like China and Russia were making America dependent on them by controlling sea lanes and technology. They felt they were no longer in control, that China and Russia could increasingly dictate to them.
Those are the underlying anxieties America’s traditional allies need to keep in mind as they “negotiate” with America. And it’s one Trump has to placate as well – he follows his voters’ urges as well as guiding them. They are ones that many Democrats worry about too.
Can we articulate a plan to “friend shore” – the supply chains that matter most for both America’s and our own security? Can we put Ukraine at the heart of it? Can it help revitalise the struggling parts of our economies?
In this moment where the meaning of words that make up international relations is up for grabs, where what is meant by terms like “security”, “strength” or “alliances” is floating, we also have a chance to redefine them.
