Both were lawyers before they became politicians, but that’s where the similarities between Keir Starmer and Richard Nixon end. The former US president resigned in disgrace at the height of the Watergate corruption scandal exactly 50 years ago. Britain’s prime minister may have been unwise to accept free tickets from Arsenal FC – but he’s not in Nixon’s league.
Except, perhaps, was there just a touch of Tricky Dicky about Starmer’s meeting with China’s president, Xi Jinping, at last week’s G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro? Watergate aside, Nixon is famous for his groundbreaking 1972 visit to Beijing, which opened the way to normalised relations between the US and Red China.
Nixon’s surprise démarche had another purpose: to show the Soviet Union, America’s cold war adversary, that the US and China could act in alliance against Moscow, which broke with Beijing in 1961. Nixon’s move, known as “playing the China card”, had significant geopolitical consequences. Starmer, dealt a weaker hand, had no aces up his sleeve.
All the same, the prime minister’s eagerness to reset what, under previous governments, became a very rocky relationship was striking. Starmer said he sought “consistent, durable, respectful, predictable” ties. “A strong relationship is important for both of our countries and for the broader international community,” he said.
It was a pointed statement. Doubtless Starmer was thinking primarily about boosting UK trade, investment and growth. But were his words also designed, Nixon-style, to send a message to a third party – namely, Donald Trump?
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The US president-elect is a vociferous foe of China, which he believes threatens American global hegemony. He plans to impose sweeping, punitive tariffs on Chinese imports, re-igniting the trade war he began in his first term. Conservative backers, such as commentator Ionut Popescu, egg him on. Containment of China must be “the driving principle of US foreign policy in the new cold war”, Popescu wrote.
Leading China hawks are being offered senior positions in the new administration, which takes office on 20 January. They include Marco Rubio as secretary of state. As a senator, Rubio railed against human rights abuses in Xinjiang and the suppression of Hong Kong’s democracy – dramatised by last week’s jailings of activists and the show trial of British media entrepreneur Jimmy Lai. Rubio reviles “the wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party”.
Trump’s choice of Pete Hegseth, a rightwing TV personality, as defence secretary, and Michael Waltz, a fierce defender of Taiwan’s independence, as national security adviser, reinforces a strong anti-China bias. These men constitute what the New York Times calls “a new class of cold warrior, guns pointed at China”. And, like Trump, they will be unimpressed by Starmer’s cosying up to Xi.
Starmer surely knows that, which makes his repositioning all the more interesting. Many in Britain, Labour and Tories, share American concerns. A House of Commons Library briefing in July traced a “sharp deterioration” in China ties in recent years, pointing in particular to Beijing’s “expansive” foreign policy and cyber-attacks and espionage in the UK. It noted Britain formally deems China a “systemic competitor” and “the greatest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security”.
Speaking in Rio, Xi was adamant that his stance on Taiwan, democracy and other core issues would not change. But he also offered reassurance with a smiley face, stressing that he sought “stable, healthy and sustainable” relations with the west – words that, like Starmer’s, may have been partly aimed at Trump.
Very deep differences remain. But Chinese and UK geostrategic interests may actually be converging in the face of Trump’s prospectively disruptive, costly, dangerous return. Climate change and post-pandemic health are two key areas of cooperation. Ongoing confrontation between the world’s top two economic and military powers would not be to Britain’s advantage. If Trump, the disquieting American, cannot be befriended and influenced, perhaps Xi can?
Other countries are making similar calculations. Germany, with its huge Chinese exports, wants to keep things friendly. The EU prefers “de-risking” to open, Trump-like ruptures, though it is divided and inconsistent. Hungary and Greece hold China close, Lithuania feuds. Europe as a whole would suffer greatly in any US-initiated global tariff war.
Emmanuel Macron was another leader making nice with Xi in Rio. France’s president raised China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, then claimed, mysteriously, to have achieved a “convergence of views”. Distancing himself from Trump, Macron said France would continue to promote European strategic autonomy, “precisely to be able to talk with China in complete independence”.
Not to be left out, Anthony Albanese, Australia’s prime minister, set aside thorny bilateral disputes and, like Starmer, shook hands with Xi on a new start. Australia, too, valued steady “calibrated” ties. Trade was flourishing again, Albanese said. “Dialogue is critical, and we’ve made encouraging progress.” Jolly Xi hugged him right back (figuratively speaking).
All this must be music to Xi’s ears. He has long dreamed of China supplanting the US as the 21st century’s foremost superpower. Beset by economic problems and a “wolf warrior diplomacy” backlash, he has launched a foreign charm offensive. Last month, he patched up a festering Himalayan border dispute with India, an old rival wooed by the US.
Trump’s victory was initially assessed as bad news for China. It may be the exact opposite. He’s unpredictable. His views change. But if “America first” means putting everyone else last, if Trump’s isolationism, aggressive nationalism and trade war threats end up screwing America’s allies, then those allies, including Starmer, may ultimately swallow their misgivings and look elsewhere for reliable friends – if only to achieve some balance. If Xi’s dream of dominance comes true, he will know who to thank. Donald Trump: Making China Great Again.
